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History plays a major role in understanding and appreciating both, the
domestic politics as well as the foreign policy of a country. This is especially
true in case of China. From a once, backward and agrarian society, China has
traversed a long path in terms of its global interests and responsibilities. Africa
is a key area of interest to China today. However, the literature available in the
public domain mostly deals with the strategic, economic or soft-power aspects
of the Sino-African bilateral relationship. Through this paper an attempt has
been made to focus on the historical transformations in this relationship. A
good understanding of the shifts and the continuities in the Sino-African ties
enables one to reflect better on China’s objectives in the African subcontinent
in the present day as well as its plans there in the near future.
History reveals that for long, China had maintained an attitude of
indifference towards the remote areas of the world, till its national interest was
directly affected. As a result of such a stand, in the 1970s and the 1980s China
had on several occasions abstained from voting on certain issues in the UN
Security Council. However, the gradual expansion of China’s military and
economic strength and consequently the broadening of its diplomatic stance,
led to a continuous and sustained evolution of its definition of national interest.
Simultaneously, there has been a growth in expectation of the international
community towards China’s expanded role in the global arena. In this context
of its progressive expansion of national interest and simultaneous rising
expectations of the international community from China, its interaction with
Africa has gained much prominence in recent times.1
* The author is a Junior Research Fellow at the Observers Research Foundation (ORF),
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Mutual Dependence of China and Africa
Quite clearly in many ways Africa is politically useful to China. Above all,
it is a source of large number of votes in the UN General Assembly and is
representative of the concerns of the poor nations of the world, on issues like
climate change at global summits. China has steadily promoted the strength of
her ties with the African continent, by repeatedly citing the event of China’s
restoration of seat in the United Nations (UN) in 1971 when 26 African nations
had voted in its favor, out of the total 76 votes that it had received. Another
objective for seeking alliance with Africa is to obtain its support in various
multilateral forums, to block the entry of Taiwan as a full member in the
respective organisations. Together with this, an attempt has been made to procure
the support of African nations on platforms like the UN Human Rights Council
where the West has openly voiced its condemnation against the Chinese track
record on the issue of human rights violation.2
Africa on its part, seeks active engagement with China mainly on economic
grounds. Robust trade ties and the export of raw materials from the continent
to China would enable the African economy to flourish. Further, the surge in
the Chinese demand for natural resources from the continent has revived a
renewed interest of several other powers towards Africa. This has encouraged
a new range of investment and investors to the region. Consequently, Africa
has been compelled to introspect on its economic future and has identified
China as a model of economic development.
The Evolution of China’s Africa Policy
China’s Africa policy has since the beginning undergone several shared
continuities as well as shifts.3 Further, it is interesting to note that the rationale
behind the Chinese interest to engage in Africa has changed over time. The
relation between the two nations can be divided briefly and broadly into three
major periods: 1949–78, 1978–99 and 2000- till date.
First Phase
During the 1950s, the foreign policy of People’s Republic of China was
directed towards seeking recognition and legitimacy, safeguarding itself against
the potential American threat and developing friendly relations with the Asian
countries to its south. By the middle of the decade, China sought to move beyond
the Communist bloc and Asia, into Africa. Such a move was a major shift in its
foreign policy strategy.
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These being the larger Chinese foreign policy objectives in the 1950s, a
brief overview may now be provided on the manner in which Africa fit into the
larger picture of China’s foreign policy agenda and the reason behind China
being interested in developing ties with the countries of this continent.
During the first phase, China’s interest in forging alliance with the African
countries was based on four fundamental goals: (1) the desire of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) to attain international acknowledgement as the only
legitimate authority of China. The recognition by 40 liberated African states to
the status of Communist China was the foremost prize; (2) Africa was viewed
as the arena in which the Chinese could fight the United States and more
importantly, combat the anti-China coalition; (3) the Chinese leadership realised
the necessity to break away from its isolation and consequently develop new
allies. This was closely linked to the aspect of Sino-Soviet conflict; (4) the self-
styled Chinese leadership against imperialism, neo-colonialism and colonialism
in the Asian-African-Latin American sphere was at stake. Had the developmental
and revolutionary model of Communist China gained acceptance from the
Africans, its international status would be immensely boosted. Anti-revisionism,
anti-colonialism and anti- imperialism were the basic tenets of China’s Africa
policy, in the initial years. In their drive to persuade the Africans, the Chinese
leadership had emphasised on three fundamental themes: self-reliance, self-
determination and Afro-Asian unity.4
The dawn of African independence movement coincided with the birth of
People’s Republic of China. This provided the Chinese leadership with a unique
opportunity to forge a thriving relationship with the continent. However in the
early days, China’s vision received a setback as some of the newly independent
states like Ethiopia, Egypt, Liberia, South Africa, showcased a pro-western
stance. Further, the states of South Africa and Ethiopia participated in a military
operation carried out by the United Nations in Korea, to combat the forces
supported by China in 1950–54. Devoid of both, a United Nations membership
as well as recognition by the United States, Beijing soon realised that the newly
independent African states which had so far been under colonial domination
were both a solution to Beijing’s legitimacy problems as well as their natural
allies.5
The ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ launched in 1949 acted as a
cornerstone to fulfill these objectives. The new states found the principles of
‘mutual non-interference’ in internal affairs, mutual respect for sovereignty
and territorial integrity, equality, mutual no-aggression and mutual benefits,
appealing in the post-colonial scenario. Consequently after the Korean War,
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Beijing embarked on a strategy of instituting official contacts with the African
countries. Thus, the first diplomatic offensive took shape in 1955 at the Bandung
Conference.6 Zhou Enlai, the then Foreign Minister of China, met a number of
African leaders during the Bandung Conference, which included the Egyptian
leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. As early as 1956, the first African state to institute
diplomatic ties with Beijing was Egypt. Hereafter, for several years Cairo
continued to serve as a base for Chinese business in the continent.7
By the mid-1960s, China put in place a well-designed policy towards Africa.
Through a number of indicators, Beijing demonstrated the high priority that it
assigned to the African theatre. Of great significance, in this regard were Zhou
Enlai’s much celebrated three visits to Africa during 1963–65, to the countries
of Ethiopia, Guinea, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Mali, Tunisia, Somalia and
United Arab Republic. During his visit, Zhou had emphasized on certain themes
of Chinese foreign policy which eventually became the founding principles
governing China’s African Policy. To state a few: complete allegiance to the
goal of revolutionary struggle, mutual political support, and third world unity.
In terms of the principle of mutual political support, China manifested its support
towards the African people through recognition of new states and offering
assistance to their national liberation movements. In return China sought the
acknowledgement of PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, assistance
to China for its effort to liberate Taiwan, resistance to the idea of creation of
“Two Chinas”, and finally reinstatement of China’s rights in the UN. The third
principle of unity of the Third World was significant as solidarity was essential
in order to maintain freedom in the face of imperialism and colonialism.
Zhou had launched a foreign aid campaign, China’s “Eight Principles of
Economic and Technical Aid” in Ghana on 15 January 1964. It stressed on
China’s contributive role in African development. Estimated figures suggest
that China’s aid commitments to Africa, in 1966 totaled $428 million.8 Thus,
seventeen of thirty eight African states as compared with fourteen African states
which maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan, recognised China. The
formal instruments thus emphasized on giving greater importance to
development of relationship with each African state. This in turn resulted in the
amplification of China’s influence in the region. 14 additional states recognised
China from 1960 to 1965. Diplomatic relations with China could be classified
into four main groups: trade agreements aiming to endorse commercial relations;
friendship treaties to promote solidarity and develop cultural and economic
relations; cultural programs encouraging student exchange programs; and lastly
technical assistance accords through which China provided assistance in
financial and other fields.
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Thus, during the first phase, the importance of Africa to communist People’s
Republic of China was at a dramatic increase. The growing importance of the
former was based primarily on two grounds: one was of seeking greater
international recognition and the other was the quest to pilot the socialist
revolution of the world. During this period, more specifically during the 1960s,
China had regarded Soviet Union as its primary enemy with China using the
subcontinent to discredit the latter “as a revolutionary force” and classifying
the Soviet Union as at par with “United States imperialism.”9
A controversial facet of the Sino-African engagement in this phase is the
installation of clandestine instruments, in its association with the liberation
movements of Africa, viz. – the connection of China with the FLNA and MPLA
in Angola, Frelimo of Mozambique, insurgents in Congo, and FLA in the state
of Algeria in the 1960s. The motive behind Beijing’s unrelenting assistance to
these groups was to amplify its reputation in the AAPSO and the Organisation
of African Unity (OAU) as well as to contend with the two superpowers,
particularly with the Soviet Bloc to maintain long term influence over the
peripheral regions of Africa. At this point of time, China failed to comprehend
the logic of giving primacy to its global socialist struggle.10
By the end of the decade two factors contributed to the decline of China’s
radical line of action: domestic and international factors. In terms of the domestic
factor, the Cultural Revolution made China more introspective; on the other
hand, increasing apprehension of a ‘Soviet menace’ gave way to development
of positive relations with the US. This in turn, culminated in China winning a
seat in the UN Security Council (1971) and achieving diplomatic recognition
from several states across the world.11 In the early 1970s, China’s African Policy
was guided by two key factors: seeking support from the developing Third
World countries and formulation of the “theory of the three worlds.” Deng
Xiaoping had presented the theory of three worlds in April 1974 in the United
Nations.12 The theory was divided into three basic parts. The first part divided
the world into three components: the First World referred to the superpowers,
the Soviet Union and the United States; the Second World consisted of Europe,
Canada, Oceania and Japan; the Third World consisted of developing continents
like Asia (besides Japan), Africa and Latin America. In the second part, China
placed itself in the group of the developing Third World countries and opposed
hegemonies. (supremacy/dominion) The third and final part consisted of an
international struggle of the Third and the Second world against the First,
primarily the Soviet Union.
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It is clearly discernible from the theory of three worlds that China was
seeking to formulate an international united front strategy against the
superpowers, primarily the Soviet Union. In order to pursue this objective China
developed relations with the members of the Third World, especially the African
states. This led to increased Chinese activism in the African arena. Three key
activities undertaken by China to project the high priority that it allotted to the
African states were as follows: firstly, between 1970 and 1977, China committed
to financial aids to 29 African states totaling almost $1.9 billion; secondly,
Beijing embarked upon a campaign to secure diplomatic recognition; and thirdly,
a program was initiated to invite African leaders to China.
Thus, China could be acclaimed with two major successes in the mid-
1970s. First, with the support of 26 African countries, PRC was able to secure
a permanent seat in the UN in 1971. Second, China won the struggle against
Taiwan in Africa. Whereas only eight African states remained in favor of Taiwan,
by 1976, almost thirty nine African states sought to maintain relations with
China. However, though China’s ambition to make inroads into the subcontinent
during the 1950s–1970s seemed to be an expedient move, it proved to be
unsustainable and financially costly. Although narrowly focused and politically
motivated, the existence of Maoism in the region at this point of time, left
behind its concrete evidence. A case in point was the construction of the
Tanzania-Zambia Railroad that was built in order to assist the people in South
Africa in their struggle for national liberation, against the forces of colonialism
and imperialism as well as to avert their dependence on the sea route in the
south that was largely controlled by the white racist regimes of Southern
Rhodesia and South Africa.13 Eventually, with China’s shift in policy from
bringing about a world revolution to developing commercial relations with the
Western nations, its activities in the subcontinent gradually but considerably
reduced.
Second Phase
The second phase corresponded to the reform period. Certain important
developments such as the reconciliation of relations between the United States
and China, abandonment of the united front policy, reopening links and reduction
of tensions with the Soviet Union, as well as reaffirmation of China’s third
world membership, took place at this point of time. These developments were
soon followed by Premier Zhao Ziyang’s visit to the African countries of Algeria,
Egypt, Guinea, Tanzania, Zambia, Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Zaire, Morocco and
Zimbabwe between December 1982 and January 1983. Such visits indicated
the sustained importance that Africa still enjoyed from China. Premier Zhao
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reiterated the general message of upholding of national independence, South-
South cooperation, preservation of national independence and Third World unity.
However a marked shift in Premier Zhao’s policy from that of his predecessor
Zhou Enlai, was in terms of the Chinese technical and economic assistance
policy to the subcontinent. Zhao had announced “Four Principles on Sino-
African Economic and Technical Cooperation” in Tanzania on 13 January 1983.
The difference in the scope of the “Four Principles” of 1983 from that of
the previous “Eight Principles” of 1964 was clearly discernible. Whereas the
1964 principles emphasized on China’s contributive role and reverence for the
“sovereignty of recipient countries”, there was no demand for special privileges
for the Chinese aid officials. On the other hand, “Four Principles” of 1983 laid
emphasis on practical results, mutual benefits, and common development.
Further, Beijing indicated the termination of its financial aid commitments to
Africa. Therefore, the key tenet governing Beijing’s new aid policy was now
more in line of mutual economic benefit.14
Despite the announcement of the “Four Principles” of aid policy in 1983,
the prime focus of China’s foreign policy during this phase, lay on developing
closer relations with the West. The main motive behind this tactic was to earn
greater FDI from the West in order to promote the development of its domestic
economy. There was also a tendency to side track Africa and reduce the amount
of aid offered to the subcontinent.
In the 1990s post the Tiananmen Square incident, when China had earned
fierce criticism from the Western quarters, it thereafter adopted an active foreign
policy approach. Consequently, in an attempt to protect itself, China sought to
build alliances with several non-western nations. It eyed the support of African
states. Owing to their numerical strength, the support of African nations would
be beneficial to China in international organisations and multilateral forums.
Therefore, Beijing now began to follow the policy of ‘multipolarity’ in the
1990s. In the last years of the twentieth century structural changes in the
international and the domestic environment had brought Africa back in the fold
of Beijing’s foreign policy. As a consequence to the Tiananmen Square incident
in 1989 and the diplomatic isolation of China, the latter’s honeymoon phase
with developed countries had come to an all-time low. The isolation was further
reinforced with the breakdown of Soviet Union. This left China as the only
surviving communist power.
During the Cold War era, confronted with the unwanted prospect of China
becoming a “pariah in the ashes” the country embarked on a diplomatic mission
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to forge relations of goodwill with the developing countries, particularly Africa.15
This strategy was undertaken to outwit the isolation created by the developed
world as well as to realign its external relations. As a part of this strategy Chinese
officials were dispatched on goodwill tours throughout the world. Subsequently,
there was an upward trend in the visit of foreign leaders into China – thereby
stabilizing relations with several countries irrespective of their ideological
commitments.
The then Foreign Minister of China, Qian Qichen visited as many as fourteen
African states from June 1989 to 1992. Several African heads of states were
invited to visit Beijing. Aid packages to African states which stood in support
of China post the Tiananmen crisis were amplified. In 1990, the Sino-African
aid to 43 recipients summed up to US$ 3746 million. This figure is significant
in comparison to the aid package of 1988 which was distributed to 13 African
states.16
The Chinese endeavor to develop close ties with the African states
was widely appreciated and hailed by the leadership in Africa. There were
twofold reasons behind this warm welcome: Firstly, the Chinese interest in the
continent came at a time when the American interest had diminished, and
secondly, support for the preservation of their solidarity and self interest in
terms of human rights and democracy. The second demand echoed widely
amongst several African regimes as they were compelled by the Western patrons
to amend their policies.
The Taiwan issue acted as a significant factor leading to the revival of
China’s African Policy, during this time. Having officially abandoned the
assertion to represent entire China, as early as 1991 the authorities of Taiwan
now sought to notch out a unique status for itself in the global community. This
seemed to many observers as a prologue to the assertion of independence.
Holding a stake of one-third votes in the UN, Africa held a position of pre-
eminence for Taiwan, as a combat zone nation struggling to seek international
recognition. This situation was further amplified in 1997 with the return of
Hong Kong under Chinese sovereignty.17
The game was gradually won by China, owing to its image of a rising
global power. This was particularly the case after the recognition of Beijing by
South Africa in 1998. In 1996, the Taiwan missile catastrophe became the cause
of further strain in the relations between the West and China. Africa once again
offered a stage of support to Beijing. Thus, in the years 1996–1997 the official
Afro-Asian tours of Premier Li Peng and President Jiang Zemin were cited by
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observers as the introductory stage for the resurgence of Africa in Beijing’s
foreign policy.
Furthermore, during this tour Jiang had revealed the proposal of launching
a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The Forum was instituted in
China after four years. In this context, the year 2000 was significant as it marked
the launch of this highly significant body in Sino-African relations.18
The rising importance of Africa in Beijing’s foreign policy was further
demonstrated by the consecutive high level tours in 2006, first by President Hu
Jintao (April) and the second by the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.19 To add
to it, a White Paper on China’s Africa policy was published in 2006. This clearly
spelt out the principles of – equality, sincerity, common prosperity, mutual
benefit, close coordination and common development – as the guiding values
of Sino-African relationship in the forthcoming years.20
African States Recognizing Communist China
Year of Year ofCountry Recognition Country Recognition
United Arab Republic 1956 Uganda 1962
Morocco 1958 Kenya 1963
Sudan 1958 Tunisia 1964
Guinea 1959 Congo (Brazzaville) 1964
Ghana 1960 Central African
Mali 1960 Republic 1964
Somalia 1960 Senegal 1964
Tanzania 1961 Zambia 1964
Algeria 1962 Dahomey 1964
Evolution of China’s Foreign Policy Towards Africa
Source: George T Yu, “Sino-African Relations: A Survey”, Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No. 7,
July 1965.
The International Situation: In the post 2000 phase some significant changes
took place in the international environment, which altered China’s foreign policy
strategy further. As a result of the shocking 9/11 attack there had been significant
changes in USA’s geo-strategic position in world affairs.21 Under the garb of
neo-conservative policy, the US attempted to expand its sphere of influence,
with a particular focus on the Middle East. On the flip side, diplomatic relations
of the US with its close allies remained greatly strained. War in Iraq had led to
the US suffering alienation from world opinion and brutally weakened the US
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‘soft power’ strategy in the international fora. With the US influence being
bogged down due to the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq and a changing geopolitical
and strategic landscape after the 9/11 incident, Beijing intended to use this
unanticipated opportunity to add to its “strategic space.”22 In this context, the
Chinese policy makers judged that alliance with the peripheral regions like
Africa would further strengthen China’s tactic against the West.
In 2002 when the fourth generation of leadership took over the CCP, there
seemed to be a further commitment to the inclusion of the third world dynamics
in the foreign policy of China. In this context, the Sino-African bonhomie was
further emphasized with the initiation of the White Paper in 2006, on China’s
African Policy. This was the same year when the third FOCAC summit took
place and China celebrated the golden jubilee of its diplomatic ties with the
subcontinent.23 The Chinese have claimed that the success of the ‘new frontier’
policy with peripheral areas like Africa, which have dominant powers like the
United States at the core and would hence help in reducing the risk and strategic
dependence of China on the west and especially on the United States of America.
When one sees the Sino-African engagement from this perspective, then the
‘new frontier diplomacy’ is perceived as a wise strategic move instead of an
opportunistic tactic.24
Third Phase
The most significant milestone that marked the commencement of the Sino-
African relationship in the twenty first century was the establishment of the
FOCAC. China has always shown an immense fascination of the African
subcontinent and more so during this phase under the model of South-South
Cooperation. In order to reinforce Sino-African collaboration, formalize bilateral
relations and curtail debates relating to China’s role in Africa, the African and
Chinese leaders had established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC/ , in 2000.25 The Forum has helped in reinforcing the
strategic partnership between People’s Republic of China and the African
subcontinent, at the turn of the century. Trade and economic cooperation have
been the underpinning objectives of this body. To add to it, China’s ‘Go Global’
( ) policy, in the late 1990s and the early 2000 have acted as a driver of
China’s investments abroad in search of unexplored new markets.26
Further, the promotion of the idea of China-Africa New Strategic Partnership
showcases the growing bonhomie between these two nations. Quite clearly, the
Sino-African relations now came to be guided by the values of mutual trust,
political equality, promotion of cultural exchange and the idea of a win-win
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strategy in economic terms. Such developments demonstrated continuity in
China’s agenda towards the subcontinent to coagulate political, diplomatic and
economic ties. Success has been achieved on this end as Sino-African trade has
witnessed an unprecedented growth, from as little as US$ 2 billion in 1999 to
$160 billion in 2011. Such an agenda has been framed through the assistance of
ministries (Ministry of Commerce, MOFCOM and Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MFA) and financial establishments like the China Development Bank, China
Exim Bank and the ChinaAfrica Development Bank.
This phase witnessed a shift in China’s objective of forging ties with the
subcontinent from initially seeking legitimacy as the sole legal government of
China to now its economic motives, of seeking oil, raw materials and natural
resources in order to sustain the domestic economic boom as well as to fulfill
its energy requirements. This was also the phase which had on one hand
witnessed a massive trade boom and increased import of goods from the sub-
continent to Beijing and simultaneously on the other hand, viewed a disjuncture
from the previously held principles of “interference” and “conditionality.” As
an evidence of this, one can cite the shift in Beijing’s demand to the African
capitals in the early years, that they should break away their ties with Taiwan in
order to acquire Chinese investment. However, this demand no longer stood
true in the first decade of the twenty first century. China’s proactive diplomacy
towards Africa in this last decade can be termed as ‘energy diplomacy’ or
‘economic diplomacy’.27 At present China ranks as the second major economy
of the world. As a developing country it has shown the fastest economic growth
with an annual average 9.8 per cent growth rate from 1979 to 2012.28
However, despite this economic growth China continuously faces shortage
of raw materials, natural resources and oil. Quite evidently it requires a massive
and steady supply of resources in order to sustain its domestic economy. China’s
requirement for oil has risen with such rapid speed that instead of being a net
exporter, it has today become an energy importer.29 It depends on foreign oil as
much as 55 per cent.30 China imports one-third of oil from the African
subcontinent.31
Apart from natural gas and oil, Beijing requires raw materials such as nickel,
copper, bauxite and natural resources like timber and so on, which are available
in abundance in Africa. Thus, China’s need and demand for growth and
development has necessitated her to invest heavily in various parts of the
continent. Examples of Chinese investments include her investment in the copper
and cobalt mines in Democratic Republic of Congo, investment of US$ 170
million in Zambian copper mines and in the titanium mines of Kenya.32 To add
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to it, the country’s increasing population and their rising consumption together
with China’s loss of agricultural land to industries has increased the country’s
quest for a stable source of basic foodstuffs. It is beyond doubt that the economic
impetus behind China’s Africa policy is for the time being limited to raw
materials and energy. Africa also presents to China a large unexplored market
for the latter’s surplus goods.
Shifts in China’s African Policy
Over the years, the trajectory of Beijing’s diplomatic tactics towards the
subcontinent of Africa has undergone gradual shifts. During the Cold War era,
China’s Africa Policy was dominated by the ‘ideology in command’ policy.33
The relationship, at this point of time, was founded on the ideology of endorsing
national liberation movements as well as promoting the idea of a world
revolution. In other words, China’s policy towards Africa during the Cold War
era was dominated by sheer ideological considerations rather than economic
rationales. The quest for economic benefits was by no means their main
consideration. It was with the adoption of the strategy of openness since the
late 1970s that ‘politics takes command’ was substituted by ‘economics takes
command’. Revolutionary ideas had lost significance in the Sino-African
relations. Since, boosting the domestic economy now became a vital issue, the
concept of ‘economic diplomacy’ started gaining more currency. An insight
into this importance given to the term ‘economic diplomacy’ can be gained
from the conference held by the State Council in 2004 on Beijing’s economic
diplomacy in the developing countries. Such a conference took place for the
first time in the history of PRC.
However, of late, the Chinese leadership has become conscious about the
fact that the idea of economic diplomacy is not sufficient by itself to preserve
its interest in the African continent. The narrative of military conflicts and
political instability in Africa poses an unceasing threat to Beijing’s economic
interest in the region. Therefore, China has realised the need to amend its one-
dimensional tactic and in turn encourage a comprehensive relationship between
the two. The Beijing Action Plan of FOCAC’s fifth ministerial summit manifests
such an idea.
This document highlights the areas of cooperation in political affairs and
for regional peace such as cooperation in external affairs and development,
economic cooperation and promotion of cultural exchanges. Although economic
diplomacy continues to be the cornerstone of China’s Africa policy yet it cannot
be the lone basis for constructing a stable relationship. Favorable economic
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relations must necessarily be cushioned on a network of mutually dependent
relations. Thus, an essential aspect of this arrangement is the exchange of human
resources. In the last decade, China has considerably invested its resources on
promoting its ‘soft power’ strategies through influencing and training elites in
the various states in Africa. China has also offered resources into training
diplomats from Africa.34
In the sphere of politics, China has shown respect and supported African
countries in their preference for political systems. In the post-Cold War period
the Western nations forcefully pursued Africa to opt for “political democracy.”35
This was mainly done to woo the subcontinent into the Western sphere of
influence. Such a policy had greatly diminished the national pride of the African
populace and had caused a social turbulence there.
From the Chinese viewpoint, preference for one’s political system and the
route to development strictly belonged to the domain of internal affairs of a
country. In line with this argument Africa had the complete right to choose
their desired model of development and it was preferred that other countries
would not interfere in such matters. Thus, the policy of “non-interference” in
China’s Africa Policy is quite clear.
Further, China believed that the imposition of any kind of a foreign model
on Africa would end up only in failure. Rather China preferred to foster an
economic cooperation based on goodwill and the ‘principles of peaceful
coexistence’.36 The African people, in turn, appreciated China’s stand on this
issue and have over time supported Beijing’s struggle against the West on the
issue of human rights violation in the United Nations Human Rights
Committee.37
Not necessarily did China seek to construct a class of ‘pro-China’ elites in
Africa. However, it desires the leadership in Africa to understand Beijing’s
policy, minimize fallacies and build a positive outlook towards China. As part
of its strategy to enhance mutual goodwill, on several occasions China has
arranged workshops to guide African officials on issues of poverty alleviation
by providing a case-study of China’s own experiences.38
Relations have thrived in the cultural sphere as well. China inked agreements
of cultural cooperation and signed annual government execution plans with the
African states with which it shared diplomatic relations. From 2007 to 2010,
five conferences on ‘China-Africa Cultural Focus’, three workshops on the
‘African Cultural Visitors Program’ and two meetings on ‘Exchange Program
of Chinese and African Cultural Visitors’, were organised by the two nations.39
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Security and military ties have stood out as dynamic features of the Sino-
African relations in the recent years. Military exchanges and cooperation between
the African states and China involve joint military assignments, financial aid,
high level visits and training programs. During the last decade, several visits
have been made by the Chinese military leadership to the African countries of
Nigeria, Algeria, South Africa and Egypt. Simultaneously, a couple of military
delegations from Africa have visited Beijing.40
A recent milestone in the Sino-African relationship has been the Ebola
outbreak in West Africa namely Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. The epidemic
was declared as a threat to world peace and security by the United Nations
Security Council in September 2014. Although both the West and China tried
to initiate measures to curb the crisis, yet assistance offered by China was the
one most widely accepted and observed as the one with the biggest intensity in
the history of China, in terms of its response to global non-traditional security
crisis.
China’s Health Diplomacy to the continent demonstrated three clear stands
of thought – its desire to project itself as a responsible stakeholder in the
international arena; its objective to protect its investments in West Africa; and
thirdly an attempt to hedge the presence of other foreign powers like India,
Brazil and the West on the African territory. This, together with the rising
displeasure of the civil society in Africa towards interference in its internal
affairs has compelled China to develop new strategies to earn the goodwill of
the masses.
Further the much discussed subject of “One Belt One Road” in China’s
foreign policy realm holds significance for Africa too. Although the Maritime
Silk Route covers only the coast of North-East Africa at present yet it is
contemplated that a synergy and goodwill in relations will definitely have a
spillover effect on the rest of Africa. The Chinese claim that the Silk Route
initiative would offer thriving employment opportunities to the local African
workforce, which in turn would contribute to the national income of the African
countries. The motive behind these measures being undertaken by President Xi
is to showcase China’s affinity towards a deeper engagement with Africa.
Clearly, in the third phase China has mainly attempted to export its economic
model to the countries of Africa. It is through the provision of economic aid
and financial support that China seeks to gain political legitimacy in these
respective nations. In this manner it is trying to spread the Beijing Consensus
in Africa. The Beijing Consensus primarily refers to the “China Model” which
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deals with political and more importantly the economic policies of the People’s
Republic of China. It is believed that over a period of two decades, this model
of economic development has helped China in seeking an eightfold growth of
its gross national product. The Beijing Consensus is largely viewed as an
alternative to the Western model of development or the Washington Consensus.
Western Perspective
China’s deepening engagement with Africa has considerably raised the level
of Western speculation. Although Sino-African cooperation exists at various
levels, the issues that are often deliberated upon are that concerned with
the flow of primary goods from Africa to China, migration of Chinese laborers
to the continent, construction of African infrastructure by the Chinese and
a cohesion on issues that involve differences with the West. These are also
the issues raised by the Western media, while discussing Sino-African
engagement.41
China is often represented as an exploiter of African economies barely
showing any concern for the sustainable political and economic development
of the latter. Western scholars such as Broadman have highlighted the detrimental
effect of the flooding in of cheap Chinese goods into the domestic markets of
Africa.42 Criticism has been hurled against Chinese firms for their outright
disregard to adhere to human rights norms as well as for offering inferior
conditions of work to the local laborers.43 Also the nature of competition put in
place by China and other new actors could be a serious disadvantage to the
American companies. This is primarily because of the fact that as the aid received
by the continent doubles the scope of competitive bids on infrastructure
projects amplifies.44 The US government has been very cautious regarding the
statements that it makes on China’s position in the continent. Without much
exaggeration or vocal objection of the legitimate right of Beijing to seek natural
resources and oil, the US has voiced its concern on Chinese activities in the
region. Foremost criticism has been voiced against China for its support for
ruinous and autocratic regimes. A case in point is China’s role in Sudan’s civil
strife. This had resulted in several “feckless and toothless” resolutions by the
UNSC.
The Western observers have also discussed about the deplorable impact of
Chinese presence in the region. They have mentioned the manner in which
certain sections of the African leadership have expressed their support for
Beijing’s willingness to evade the conditions of transparency, good governance
and human rights – the strings that are mostly attached with the Western aid.
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There are still a few other challenges that have been identified both by African
as well as Western scholars. The trend of import of Chinese laborers for various
infrastructure projects in the continent has limited the scope of employment for
the local populace. Also, the textile industry in Africa that had earlier enjoyed
thriving development under the US-African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA), now has suffered great loss. Most importantly, the Chinese presence
in the continent has had a devastating effect on the timber industry. Clearly,
China has been a chief participant and a key importer of African timber. In
order to meet its domestic need of timber, China offers financial assistance and
carries out logging in the region of Central Africa. The West claims that through
such practices not only does China violate the environmental rules of the land,
but also transports its own environmental problems abroad.
The report “More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic US Approach
Towards Africa” published by the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) in January
2006 essentially discussed the US policy towards Africa. The report highlighted
that violation of human rights and lack of transparency and good governance
were the common features of the Chinese offering protection to the African
regimes. It was in response to this report that China had released the White
Paper on China’s Africa Policy in 2006. China reiterated that the country’s
foreign policy towards Africa was essentially founded on seeking development,
promoting trade and commerce as well as encouraging African representation
on global platforms.
It cannot be ruled out that Beijing has relentlessly supported Africa with
the much needed aid and investment. This has been followed by several pledges
in the Forum of China Africa Cooperation that was created in 2000. The pledges
have related to the cancellation of African debt to the tune of $1 billion,
encouraging trade, tourism and investment between the two countries.
Some Western scholars have identified a marked contrast between the
Chinese willingness to undertake the construction of infrastructure projects to
that of the restricted attention of the US aid programs towards the same. This
issue has earned such prominence in the African continent that even those
countries that are reliant on aid from the West have appreciated China’s policies
to contribute in such areas.
In response to the various criticisms hurled on China, the Chinese have
abstained from making remarks regarding the drawbacks and hindrances in the
Sino-African relations. Although issues relating to the dearth of Chinese desire
to mingle with the local populace, complaints relating to the quality of the
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cheap Chinese goods and the overall benefit that ordinary people are making
from the aid projects are not deliberated upon, yet methods to protect the
environment have been duly recognised and acknowledged.
Conclusion
With China emerging strong economically, politically and militarily in the
international realm today, one can expect its enhanced role in Africa in the near
future. China’s African policy continues to reflect Beijing’s expanding
diplomatic horizon, its continuously widening definition of national interest,
together with a transformation of China’s status from a regional power player
to a global power player. There is some latent realisation within the African
community as well, that China will definitely have a role to play in the
renaissance of the African economic boom. Today, China seeks to escalate its
political influence in the region based on its robust economic ties with the
respective states in the continent. Satisfaction of its economic appetite is and
will continue to be China’s key objective towards the continent. Thus, it is only
with a lucid understanding of the historical trajectory of their bilateral ties that
one can better identify the shifts, continuities and the strategic dynamism of
Sino-African relationship.
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